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foundation, works for the elimination of mines, explosive remnants of war and other explosive hazards, such as unsafe munitions stockpiles. The GICHD
provides advice and capacity development support, undertakes applied research, disseminates knowledge and best practices and develops standards.
In cooperation with its partners, the GICHD's work enables national and local authorities in affected countries to effectively and efficiently plan,
coordinate, implement, monitor and evaluate safe mine action programmes, as well as to implement the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the
Convention on Cluster Munitions and other relevant instruments of international law. The GICHD follows the humanitarian principles of humanity,
impartiality, neutrality and independence.

This report was written by Mike Kendellen, independent consultant.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Lebanon’s mine/Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) contamination problem stems from
more than 40 years of intermittent conflict involving neighbouring Israel and Syria as well as
various non-state armed groups. With the brunt of the contamination in the country’s
southern provinces, mine action in Lebanon was mostly concentrated in the south.
Lebanon began addressing its contamination problem internally in 1998 through the
creation of the National Demining Office (NDO). The NDO was responsible for establishing a
national database, an annual work plan and an emergency response capacity. It was also in
charge of developing a strategic integrated national mine action plan, with the aim of
clearing mined areas and reducing risk through risk education (RE). It was only in 2000,
however, when Israel withdrew its forces from south Lebanon, that mine action in the
country became internationally recognized. That year, the United Nations Mine Action
Service (UNMAS) and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) set up the
Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC). With the UN in charge of the operational
management of mine action, NDO became exclusively responsible RE and victim assistance
(VA) and overall coordination.
In 2002, the Lebanese Government signed an agreement with the United Arab Emirates
(UAE), which created Operation Emirates Solidarity (OES), a 2-year, USD 50 million project
to clear mines and ERW in the formerly Israeli occupied areas in south Lebanon. Under the
OES, the MACC was expanded into a tripartite structure composed of the UN, the Lebanese
Armed Forces (LAF) and the UAE. Under this new structure, the MACC changed its name to
MACC South Lebanon or MACC SL.
Although the NDO, which became the Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC) in 2007,
remained the official mine action authority, with strategic and coordinating responsibilities,
MACC SL was indeed the operational arm of mine action in Lebanon. Hence, the actual
transition that occurred in January 2009 was more a logistical transfer of responsibilities
from the UN component of the MACC SL (UNMACC) to the LMAC, giving LMAC full strategic,
coordination and operational control over mine action in south Lebanon. However, there
seems to be no precise and unanimous agreement on how to characterise what actually
occurred in January 2009 between UNMACC and the LMAC. Within the Lebanese mine
action community, the term “transition” is used interchangeably with “handover”, “hand
back” and “exit” in documents and discussions. One non-governmental organisation (NGO)
director in Lebanon characterised the change in management as an exit by the UN rather
than a transition to national ownership, eliciting the assumption that Lebanese authorities
were in charge the whole time. And while LMAC has referred it to as “resuming
responsibility,” one RMAC officer viewed it solely as a logistical operation: “It was like
moving your house. You packed the furniture and re-located.”
Regardless of how the transition is understood, the UN continues to play a role, albeit much
more limited, in mine action in Lebanon, mainly through a capacity development project.
Led by UNDP, the project is currently in its second phase.

INTRODUCTION
Lebanon is located in the Middle East, with an area of 10, 452 bordering Syria, Israel and
the Mediterranean Sea. The estimated population in 2011 was of 4.1 million people,
with almost half living in the capital, Beirut. Lebanon is a high-middle-income country
which has experienced notable economic and social progress, with its economy growing
at an annual average rate of eight per cent since 2006 and average GDP per capita of
USD 6,500 in 2008.1 However, poverty remains a problem, as eight per cent of the
population still lives in extreme poverty and 28.5 per cent lives below the upper poverty
line, which translates into only USD 4 per capita per day.2
Lebanon’s mine /ERW contamination is a legacy of more than 40 years of intermittent
conflict, which involved neighbouring countries and various non-state armed groups.
The July – August 2006 invasion by Israel is the most recent conflict and it resulted in
heavy contamination of cluster submunitions in the south.3
The Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) conducted by the Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
between March 2002 and August 2003 identified 306 mine-impacted communities
containing 933 distinct mine/ERW contaminated sites. The contamination spanned an
estimated 137 square kilometres of land, directly affecting the livelihoods and safety of
more than one million people. The LIS also found that apart from Mount Lebanon, most
of the contamination was in the country’s southern provinces, with the latter also
suffering the highest casualty rates.
And despite progress, socio-economic development in Lebanon continues to be affected
by mine/ERW contamination, which has hindered the execution of a major drinking and
irrigation water pipeline projects and impeded the use of most agricultural land in the
south.

1

World Bank, Lebanon;
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/LEBANONEXTN/0,,menuPK:294911~pagePK:14
1132~piPK:141121~theSitePK:294904,00.html.
2
UNDP, “Fast Facts: Lebanon,” United Nations Development Programme, 2011:
http://www.undp.org.lb/FastFactSheets/Poverty_social.pdf
3
UN, “2009 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” November 2008, New York, p. 235.
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OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION PROGRAMME4

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The Lebanese Mine Action Authority (LMAA), an interministerial body established in
1998 by the Council of Ministers, is chaired by the Minister of Defense. The LMAA is
responsible for the Lebanon national mine action programme.5 The 2007 National Mine
Action Policy outlines the structure, roles and responsibilities of the mine action
programme in Lebanon. LMAC, a part of the LAF, has the overall responsibility for the
management and implementation of the mine action policy and strategy, including the
coordination of risk education and victim assistance.
The LMAC structure consists of:
•
•
•
•
•
•

the director
an assistant
a secretary
a security officer
the UNDP chief technical advisor
seven sections:
o operations
o quality assurance/quality control
o information technology
o media mine risk education with a steering committee
o mine victims assistance with a steering committee
o admin logistics
o a regional mine action centre in Nabatieh

When the Council of Ministers created the national mine action programme in 1998, it
mandated that a database be created. The LMAC information management section is
responsible for the management of mine action data. Its database, using IMSMA
software, includes data from the 2002–2003 LIS, results from the technical survey
project, and clearance operations after the July-August 2006 hostilities. RE activities and
casualty data are also recorded in IMSMA. LMAC planned to upgrade to IMSMA new
generation in 2011.
4

The Lebanon mine action programme from 2000-2008 is well documented. This case-study utilised annual reports
4
from the Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC-SL) , LMAC strategy and implementation documents,
memorandums of understanding between MACC-SL and LMAC, funding proposals and the final Operation Emirates
Solidarity report from 2004. Interviews in Lebanon with LMAC, RMAC, UNDP, UNMACC, Mines Advisory Group
(MAG), DanChurchAid (DCA), Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA) and DynCorp International took place from 24 -31 August
2010. At the time of this study in August 2010, only a few people remained with UNMACC, UNDP, and the NGOs in
Lebanon that were there during the transition in January 2009.
5
LMAC, “Mine Action in Lebanon: Mine Action Structure,” www.lebmac.org.
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The position of head of information technology and information management at LMAC
is a civilian position funded through the UNDP capacity development project. The IT and
information management section produces reports, analysis and maps information for
planning. The GIS department of the Ministry of Defense also provides maps to LMAC.
The Lebanon mine action programme is defined by the period when the Israelis
withdrew from south Lebanon in May 2000 after an 18-year occupation, leaving behind
approximately 400,000 landmines, and after the July-August 2006 invation by Israel,
when approximately four million cluster submunitions were dropped on south Lebanon.
National ownership has never been in doubt. According to the director of the LMAC, the
mine action programme in Lebanon has been nationally owned since its inception in
1998, when the government created the NDO and gave it complete responsibility for
clearing all mines, reducing risk and coordinating victim assistance.
On practical grounds, the transition of operational control from UNMACC to LMAC was
more of a change in management, including adapting to a more military command-andcontrol style of management, than any change in policies and procedures that might
have impacted clearance operations. For NGOs, the change since January 2009 is that
RMAC issues task orders and conducts quality assurance, rather than MACC SL.
UNMACC in Tyre relocated to Naqoura and assumed a lesser but still important role in
coordinating clearance operations with United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL) troops.6
One significant difference in the mine action programme since the transition in January
2009 is the frequency in reporting on achievements and the remaining problems. From
2006-2008, the MACC SL produced monthly and annual reports, funding updates and
analysis, and managed a website (www.maccsl.org). The website is no longer
operational, though its reports are still available at www.mineaction.org. Reporting on
the mine action programme since January 2009 has been reduced to presentations at
international meetings, related to the Anti Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the
Convention on Cluster Munition. While LMAC operates its own website, it was not upto-date as of August 2010 and contained no current data or detail comparable with
what was available in the MACC SL reports. This lack of regular reporting, combined
with LMAC’s tight control over data, is a weak point in the post-transition period.
Several factors have influenced the role the LMAC has had on operations in south
Lebanon:

6

Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of National Defense and the United Nations Mine Action
Service, 13 October
2010.
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•
•
•
•
•
•

the UNIFIL mandate
Operation Emirates Solidarity
the July–August 2006 hostilities
limited resources within the Ministry of Defense
the presence of commercial and NGO mine/ERW operators
the UNMACC capacity development programme

The MACC SL was a joint structure consisting of LAF officers from the LMAC, military
officers from the UAE and personnel from UNMAS. The MACC SL area of responsibility
was from the Awali river in Saida in south Lebanon, down to and including the Blue Line
bordering Israel. The LMAC delegated all mine action coordination authority to the
MACC SL within this part of the country.7
The MACC SL was responsible for operational planning, tasking, quality assurance and
coordination in south Lebanon, with the LAF officers of the MACC SL playing an integral
part in management and coordination. All decisions were made jointly between the LAF
and the UN components of the MACC SL. The LMAC was responsible for all other areas
north of the Awali river.
HISTORY OF THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME8

The Lebanon mine action programme can be divided into three phases.
1. The first phase (1975-2000) was defined by the civil war, when landmines were
laid throughout Lebanese territory, and the creating of the NDO in 1998.
2. The second phase (2000-mid 2006) included the withdrawal of Israel from south
Lebanon, the deployment of UNIFIL, the creation of UNMACC, and the
establishment of MACC SL under the auspices of the OES project.
3. The third phase (mid 2006-present) was characterised by the July 2006 Israeli
attack, which contaminated south Lebanon with more than four million cluster
munitions, the transfer of authority from the National Demining Office (NDO) to
LMAC, and the adoption, after 2007 of the long term plan for 2008-2012.
Each phase is detailed below.
THE FIRST PHASE: 1975-1990

The first phase is the 1975-1990 civil war, when landmines were laid throughout the
country, particularly along the UN-delineated Blue Line between Lebanon and Israel in
7

Letter from Brig.-General Mohammed Fehmi to UNMAS, 7 May 2007.
This section is based on UNMACC Annual Reports 2001-2008, www.mineaction.org; End State Strategy and Long
Term Plan 2008-2012; http://www.lebmac.org and the Operation Emirates Solidarity Final Report Phase 1-3, 2004.
8
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the south, in areas north of the Litani river, in the Bekaa valley, and on Mount Lebanon.
The Engineer Regiment of the Lebanese Armed Forces conducted clearance operations,
but not to international standards.
In April 1998, the Council of Ministers passed Resolution No. 29 and created a mine
action programme framework, consisting of the Ministry of Defense as the national
mine action authority, the army-led NDO and the Lebanese Army Engineer Regiment.
The Resolution required the NDO to establish a national database, an annual work plan
and an emergency response capacity. The NDO also established steering committees to
coordinate RE and VA activities. The NDO was also tasked to develop a strategic
integrated national mine action plan, with the aim of clearing mined areas and reducing
risk through RE.
THE SECOND PHASE: 2000-MID 2006

The second phase began in 2000, when Israel withdrew from south Lebanon after an
18-year occupation, leaving behind approximately 400,000 landmines. The 2001 UN
Security Council Resolution 13379 authorised the UNIFIL peacekeeping operation, which
had been in Lebanon since 1978, to conduct mine clearance operations in south
Lebanon.
“…[T]he contribution of UNIFIL to operational demining, encourages further assistance in
mine action by the United Nations to the Government of Lebanon in support of both the
continued development of its national mine action capacity and emergency demining
activities in the south, and calls on donor countries to support these efforts through
financial and in-kind contributions…”
In 2000, an UNMAS assessment recommended an emergency international rapid
response in the south, because tensions with Israel prevented the LAF from becoming
operational in this part of the country (the LAF Engineer Regiment of deminers operated
only in north Lebanon). The expected return of tens of thousands of displaced people
could have resulted in numerous accidents and casualties. UNIFIL requested UNMAS to
establish a mine action coordination cell to assist in demining south of the Litani river,
an area of approximately 700 square kilometres.

The UN strategy for assistance to Lebanon was to accelerate mine action operations and
to assist the Lebanese government in strengthening its capacity in all areas of mine
action. The strategy included using all UN sources available in Lebanon at the time,
including UNIFIL, UNICEF, UNMAS and UNDP, to implement a capacity development
programme that would strengthen the NDO.
9

UN Security Council Resolution 1337, http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/231/38/PDF/N0123138.pdf?OpenElement
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Based on interviews and desk research, it is apparent that in 2000, the Lebanese army
and the Engineer Regiment lacked the human resources needed to manage the
operational side of a mine action programme of the scale required to tackle the
landmine contamination.
In recognition of the role and status of the LAF in mine action, and foreseeing the
inevitable closure of the MACC SL, LAF army officers and other personnel were
embedded into the MACC SL in Tyre under the OES project. This was based on the
assumption that the skills acquired under UN mentoring and guidance would be
applied, once the LMAC took full control of the operations in south Lebanon.
“A memorandum of understanding” between the government of Lebanon and the UAE
mandated UNMAS to establish a mine action coordination centre in south Lebanon in
Tyre, in order to plan, coordinate and monitor the OES project. UNMAS, through the
UNMACC, used data from UNIFIL demining teams, NDO assessments and maps and
records provided by the Israeli army, to develop the humanitarian demining
programme.10 Although the NDO (later the LMAC), was the mine action authority, and
though the Army Engineer Regiment had been clearing mines for many years and
coordinating national NGOs in RE, it had limited resources to undertake a project as
large as OES .
The role of LMAC in the project was to ensure national policy and directives were
followed. The LMAC contingent included the following from the LAF:
•
•
•
•
•
•

one project manager
one chief of operations
one planning officer
four quality assurance officers
one officer to work in the IMSMA database unit
eight soldiers, assigned as “assistants”

Through on-the-job training, LAF officers gained experience in planning, task
assessment and monitoring.11
The memorandum of understanding between the governments of the UAE and Lebanon
defined the official role of NDO as:
•

a facilitator in obtaining radio frequencies and office space

10

UNMACC, “Annual Report 2007,” 3 March 2008, p. 3. The Blue Line is the area lying along the southern border of
Lebanon, between Echo Road and the southern border between Lebanon and Occupied Palestinian Territories and
Israel. Operation Emirates Solidarity Final Report 2004 Phase 1-3.
11
UNMACC, “OES Final Report Phase 1-3,” May 2002-May 2004.
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•
•
•
•

coordinating protection
importing and re-exporting explosives
providing information on mined areas
ensuring visas for international staff to ensure the project ran smoothly

The NDO had little real responsibility or decision making power.12
The LAF officers were tasked with conducting technical surveys and quality assurance.
The OES project also included international commercial demining companies and
deminers from Zimbabwe, Mozambique and the UAE. No nationals were recruited as
deminers, because it was considered too time consuming and unreliable to hire and
train them.
While MACC SL was implementing the OES project, the NDO and the UNDP ‘Capacity
Building for Mine Action Centre’ project launched a mine action strategic review in
2003. It identified the need for policy development, national standards, strategies, work
plans and documentation, including regular reporting, which resulted in the End-State
Strategy for Mine Action in Lebanon (ESS) in 2004. The ESS contains the assumptions for
mine action planning, based on LIS data, and the desired description of Lebanon at the
end of clearance operations.13
The ESS assumed that Lebanon, like other countries that have experienced war, was
unlikely to become completely free of mines. In support of this critical assumption, it
sought to create a national capacity to deal with residual contamination after the mine
action programme had been formally completed. The “demining end-state condition”
was stated as one in which “all known dangerous areas, where there is substantial
threat to life and limb or which hinder socio-economic development, are demined to a
level that is “as low as reasonably acceptable” (ALARA), according to national laws and
standards, and international mine action standards (IMAS).”14 The ESS also identified
the need for:
•
•

an effective explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capacity to map cleared or
marked dangerous areas
coordination between mine/UXO awareness and demining.

It contained 12 guidelines for implementation:

12

Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United Arab Emirates and the Lebanese Republic
Concerning the Contribution of the United Arab Emirates to Mine Clearance in Lebanon
13
NDO, “End State Strategy (ESS) for Mine Action in Lebanon,” March 2005, pp. 1–4.
14
ALARA is an acronym for the phrase “as low as reasonably achievable”. It is a principle often used in reducing
exposure to chemicals whereby in an ideal world, one could reduce exposure to hazardous materials, such as
landmines or cluster submunitions to zero but in reality, social, technical, economic, practical, or public policy
considerations could result in a small but acceptable level of risk. www.ilpi.com/msds/ref/alara.html
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Guidelines in the E-S S on Implementing Mine Action
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Apply national mine action priorities
Continue use of IMAS and maintaining support to international mine action
Use all mine information data – Lebanon LIS and IMSMA database
Support socio-economic development plans
Continue, and accelerate resource mobilisation
Use programme and project management principles and capacity development, through
national staff training and human skills development
Implement mine\UXO Survey, verification, area reduction and marking on a priority
basis
Establish cost controls and operating principles that get maximum value for the money
Provide for sustainability
Obtain international technical advice, as needed
Employ civilian national subject matter experts (SME) in the mine action programme
Communication in both English and Arabic is essential

Subsequently, LMAC produced annual work plans and a long term plan for 2005-2009,
to remove the impact of mines and UXO in all high and medium priority areas by the
end of 2009 through:
•
•
•
•
•

survey
clearance
area reduction
marking
fencing

According to the ESS, Lebanon would be free from the impact of mines within 10 - 15
years of the start of this plan, or sometime between 2015 and 2019.
In 2005, the NDO saw overall coordination of the mine action programme as its primary
function in order to meet the goals of the ESS. The Ministry of Defense and the LAF
made all policy decisions, with input from the NDO director. The NDO coordinated all
organisations and projects executed as part of the Lebanon mine action programme.
The 2005 national plan indicates that the NDO struggled with this role. The plan
describes in considerable detail the difference between managing a programme and a
project. According to NDO, the Lebanon mine action programme fit the definition of a
“programme” because it was:
•
•

large
complex
8

•
•
•
•
•

maintained an office
was geographically dispersed
used contractors to provide services
assumed an end state
was visible to the public

In contrast, a “project” was temporary, with very specific goals, such as OES, with MACC
SL responsible for operational control, MRE or a LIS.
Despite the NDO’s lack of control in operations in south Lebanon, by 2005 through OES,
UNIFIL, international commercial companies and MAG, 5.9 square kilometres of cleared
land had been released for use, and the number of annual casualties had decreased
from more than 90 in 2001 to 14 in 2004.15
THE THIRD PHASE: MID-2006-PRESENT

With the goals of the ESS closer to being achieved, Lebanon made preparations to
submit a proposal as part of the UNDP Completion Initiative16, to clear all high and
medium impact minefields by 2010, excluding the mined areas along the Blue Line, and
to develop a residual capacity to respond to the remaining contamination.
In mid-2006, an impact-free state with a residual problem seemed achievable in just a
few years. Ongoing technical surveys would further reduce the area to be cleared and
lower the cost of clearing the remaining mined areas. The planning and optimism came
to an abrupt end in July 2006 when Israel attacked Lebanon, and in a one month period,
fired over four million cluster munitions into south Lebanon. With cluster sub-munition
contamination, Lebanon entered the third phase in its history of landmines/ERW.
After hostilities stopped in mid-August 2006, south Lebanon faced a humanitarian crisis.
Streets, farms, schools and homes were littered with sub-munitions, and there were
approximately one million internally displaced persons. Throughout the war, the UN
programme manager and the UN chief of operations for the MACC SL had remained in
Tyre, making preparations and planning for the eventual end to the fighting and the
enormous clearance task that would ensue. Immediately after the fighting ended, the
Lebanese army engineers conducted initial clearance operations, as they were the only
clearance capacity in the country at the time.

15

NDO, “Integrated Work Plan for Mine Action in Lebanon 2005 (co-produced through the UNDP Capacity Building
for Mine Action Assistance Project).
16
Eligibility was roughly based on being able to clear all remaining mine areas within 3-5 years for USD 10 million or
less.
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LMAC records indicate the Engineer Regiment found and cleared nearly 100,000 submunitions in just a few months, a quantity representing over 50 per cent of all cluster
sub-munitions found as of July 2010. The MACC SL became the operational hub for the
rapid response. In its 2007 annual report, the MACC SL described its mission as being
“responsible for ensuring the protection of the local civilian population living in south
Lebanon and Area 6.”17 LMAC did not issue its own reports for 2006-2008.
Donors responded to the post-July-August 2006 emergency. From September 2006 to
December 2008, the MACC SL was able to accredit 60 battle area clearance (BAC)
teams, eight EOD teams, 14 manual demining teams, six mechanical teams, and two
mine detection dog (MDD) teams. Together they employed 1,070 national and 246
international staff, comprising NGOs, commercial demining companies and
peacekeepers. At the same time, UNIFIL increased its demining and EOD capacities
following UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which allowed UNIFIL to contribute to
the humanitarian clearance operations under the direct coordination of the UNMACC.
The work of the MACC SL after July 2006 did not go unnoticed. The UN awarded the the
UNMACC the UN 21 commendation for excellence and outstanding work.18 The UNHCR
also awarded the UNMACC the 2008 Nansen Refugee Award for its rapid response to
the 2006 crisis and for taking the lead in clearing cluster munitions. The UNHCR press
release on the Nansen Award did not mention the role the LAF or LMAC had had in the
removal of over 145,000 submunitions. The LMAC does not mention these awards in its
presentations to stakeholders about the period either. Nevertheless, all LMAC
personnel embedded at the MACC SL received certificates recognising their important
role and contribution to the overall success of the MACC SL. Additionally, there is no
record indicating that national government officials attended the award ceremonies in
Tyre or in Geneva.
In 2007, the Lebanese Cabinet revised the 1998 mine action policy to reflect the events
of 2006. It issued Decree 10 /2007 that replaced the NDO with LMAC, placing it under
the command of the deputy chief of staff for operations of the LAF in charge of all
aspects of mine action. The policy stated that, “The LMAC shall task, coordinate and
authorise all humanitarian demining related activities including landmine and ERW
survey, mapping, marking, clearance and land recovery.”
The policy intended to strengthen LMAC, which would be responsible for:
• accreditation
• quality control and quality assurance
• the management of the database
17

Area 6 is Nabatieh district north of the Litani river. Its clearance was covered under the second phase of Operation
Emirates Solidarity which began at the end of 2006 and ended in March 2008.
18
The UN21 Awards were established in 1996 to recognize outstanding initiatives by individual staff members or
teams to improve the delivery of the United Nation’s programmes and services.
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•
•

MRE
VA

The policy also outlined that LMAC could seek support and collaboration from national
and international organisations as needed. The decree stated it was LMAC’s
responsibility to manage the mine action programme on behalf of the Lebanon Mine
Action Authority (LMAA). The decree also authorised LMAC to solicit international and
national assistance as needed, and describes the role and membership of the
International Support Group (ISG), including representatives from UNDP, the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Office of the Personal Representative of the
Security General, and ambassadors from donor countries. It states clearance operations
will follow national standards, and it establishes monitoring guidelines. It also states
that Lebanon planned to become a signatory of the APMBC and the Convention on
Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II.19
In conjunction with the decree, the LMAC requested the UNMACC (the UN component
of the MACC SL) to maintain its operational functions in south Lebanon and continue to
provide technical, operational and strategic advice to the LAF Engineering Regiment and
LMAC until the end of 2008, when LMAC would take charge of operations from a
regional base in Nabatieh.20 UNMAS agreed that UNMACC would hand over a
manageable and residual mine and ERW problem in south Lebanon and “return all
delegated responsibilities for clearance operations” to the LMAC after 2008.” The
memorandum of understanding between the Lebanon Ministry of Defense and UNMAS
was not signed until October 2009, ten months after the transition occurred.21
Also in 2007, Lebanon adopted a long term plan for 2008–2012 to reflect the impact of
the 2006 hostilities and the planned clearance scheduled for 2007. A primary goal was
to implement technical surveys and eliminate the impact in all high and medium
impacted communities identified in the 2002–2003 LIS by 2011.22
In the midst of the structural changes and the request from LMAC for the UNMACC to
stay in south Lebanon until the end of 2008, there were signs that Lebanon was making
significant progress in clearing cluster submunitions. UNMACC said south Lebanon
would be impact free of all landmines and cluster munitions, excluding the Blue Line.
The statement was repeated by the MACC SL programme manager Chris Clark in
October 2008 in an interview available on the UNHCR website, “……….by the end of this
19

National Mine Action Policy March 2007. On 18 August 2010 Lebanon ratified the Convention on Cluster
Munitions. As of August
2011 Lebanon had not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty.
20
Letter from Brig.-General Mohammed Fehmi to UNMAS, 7 May 2007.
21
Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of National Defense and the United Nations Mine Action
Service, 13 October
2010.
22
NDO, “Long Term Plan 2008–2012,” Beirut, p. 9.
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year (2008) we will have addressed the unexploded cluster bomb problem to such a
degree that it will have a negligible impact on the civilian population. They will have
pretty much total access to their land. Anything that's left will, by and large, be in
remote, uninhabited areas. This residue can be tackled at a slower and less urgent pace
over the coming years.”23
The MACC SL was responsible for resource mobilisation as well as interacting with
international and local media. It seems some donors may have misunderstood
statements on what MACC SL said about south Lebanon being free of all mines and
cluster munitions by the end of 2008. It could be argued that this misunderstanding
was a factor that led to a decline in funding in 2009, although it cannot be discounted,
since donors had, between 2006 – 2008, already given close to 130 million US dollars
toward emergency clearance of south Lebanon,. A decline in funding was inevitable,
particularly when much of the high priority areas had been cleared.24 It could also be
said that the transfer of operational responsibility from UNMACC to LMAC created an
opportunity for donors to pull back and wait and see how operations continued without
the UN overseeing them.
For various reasons, south Lebanon was not free from the impact of cluster
submunitions at the end of 2007 or in 2008. According to the MACC SL, poor weather
conditions, the underestimation of the level of contamination, the unstable political
situation and a gradual reduction in the number of clearance teams from a peak of 60
BAC teams in 2007 to 48 in 2008 combined to prevent Lebanon from being impact free.
On 1 January 2009, LMAC, through the regional mine action centre in Nabatieh, took full
responsibility for the management of all clearance operations in the south, except for
those conducted by UNIFIL on the Blue Line.25 The UN component of the MACC SL
(UNMACC) reverted to its role as a coordination centre with UNIFIL, and relocated to
the UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura. At the time of the transition, the MACC SL
reported that 47 per cent of surface clearance and 29 per cent of subsurface clearance
had been completed.26
GOVERNMENT SUPPORT TO THE PROGRAMME

The mine action programme in Lebanon is the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense
23

Chris Clark interview, 3 October 2008, www.unhcr.org/48e620da2.html.
International funding statistics found in Landmine Monitor from 1999-2009 show that emergency funding quickly
drops after the
initial funding phase.
25
Presentations by Brig.-Gen. Mohammed Fehmi, LMAC, at the twelfth meeting of national directors and UN
advisors, Geneva on
24 March 2009, and to the international support group in Beirut on 14 May 2009. See also UN Security Council,
“Ninth report of the
Secretary-General on Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006),” S/2009/119, 3 March 2009, para. 43.
26
MACC SL Annual Report 2008
24
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through the Lebanon Mine Action Center in Beirut and the regional mine action centre
in Nabatieh. The centres are staffed with army personnel from the Engineer Regiment.
The offices in Beirut and Nabatieh are located in military compounds provided by the
Ministry of Defense. The estimated cost of the army officers and military staff in 2010
was approximately USD 6.5 million for the year.
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CURRENT STATUS OF THE LEBANON MINE ACTION
PROGRAMME
PLANNING CAPACITIES

The Lebanon national mine action policy provides for an inter-ministerial committee to
establish guidance and priorities for government strategic plans affecting mine action
priorities. A consultative approach to selecting local mine clearance priorities helps
ensure that local governance advice is incorporated into national programmes.
LMAC, under the command of the deputy chief of staff for operations of the LAF, is the
coordinating body for all mine action in Lebanon, and is responsible for implementing
and coordinating the mine action programme.27 Mine clearance priorities are
established by the LMAC and presented to the chief of operations for approval. The
requirements for mine clearance are submitted to the LMAC by ministries and other
sources in an ad-hoc manner.
Since 2004, Lebanon has given increased attention to post-clearance humanitarian
factors and socio economic development, especially in south Lebanon. UNDP, as part of
its socio economic project based in south Lebanon, drafted project proposals in 2004 for
the rehabilitation of areas cleared of mines, but no development projects connected
with mine action were created in 2005 or 2006. Instead, private or commercial
enterprises have largely developed the cleared land.
From 2002-2008, when the MACC SL managed the clearance operations in south
Lebanon, it maintained the data for its area of responsibility. The data would be
synchronised with the LMAC in Beirut on a weekly basis to ensure there was an up-todate national database.
An internal LMAC SWOT analysis identifies the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities
and threats in Lebanon’s mine action programme. It cannot be stated enough that
LMAC sees the fact that the LAF manage the mine action programme as a major
strength, and they possess a level of knowledge and expertise that provides credibility
to donors and clearance operators.
The analysis indicates that the mine action programme is a diverse combination of
international and national support made up of military and civilian personnel. The
weaknesses and threats are limited to funding, security and the terrain, which impacts
the cost and speed in which clearance operations can be conducted.

27

LMAC, “Lebanon Mine Action Center” www.lebmac.org.
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SWOT Analysis of LMAC28
Strengths
Lebanon mine action programme managed by LAF
Determination, knowledge and expertise
Good relationships between LAF and NGOs
Expertise of Engineer Regiment
Opportunities
Different sources of funding
Diverse actors
UN agencies, UNIFIL troops, international and
national NGOs, commercial companies
Gender in mine action activities; civilian employees

Weaknesses
Lack of funding
Lack of under-water EOD expertise
Demining equipment shortage
Movement of vehicles
EOD publications concerning TM 60 Series
Threats
Competition with other regional mine action
programmes for resource funding
Unpredictable hostilities and acts of terrorism
Variation in terrain throughout Lebanon

DEMINING CAPACITIES

In 2010, the number of BAC and clearance teams was far less than the 2006-2008
period, despite the formation of two national NGOs and new funding from the
European Commission in June 2010, which increased the number of clearance teams.
In September 2009, Peace Generation Organization for Demining (POD), a national
NGO, was established. It works in partnership with the Iranian organisation, Immen
Sazan Omran Pars (ISOP), and is funded by the government of Iran.29 As of July 2010,
clearance capacity consisted of LAF, MAG, NPA, DCA, POD, DynCorp International and
UNIFIL, and was made up of BAC, mechanical, mine clearance and EOD survey teams.
After the cessation of hostilities in mid-August, and in accordance with the UN Security
Council Resolution 1701, UNIFIL increased its demining and EOD capacities.
Coordinating with UNIFIL, the UNMACC gained agreement from the force commander
for EOD/BAC teams to contribute to the humanitarian clearance of cluster munitions
and other ERW within the UNIFIL area of operations.
Throughout the conflict, planning benefited from the presence of UNMAS staff in Tyre
(southern Lebanon) and the UNDP’s chief technical advisor in Beirut. The plan focused
on the deployment of EOD teams as well as BAC teams to deal with the perceived
accumulation of ERW. Since early 2010, UNIFIL has not had a BAC capacity. Its future
role in the mine action programme is likely to be reduced when a new memorandum of
understanding between UNFIL and the Ministry of Defense is concluded in 2011.
With seed money from the US Department of State through DynCorp International, the
28
29

LMAC Presentation 24 August 2010, Beirut.
Ibid.
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national NGO Lebanon demining office (LDO) began to carry out non-technical surveys
for the regional mine action centre (RMAC) in Nabatieh in August 2010, in order to
verify information in the national mine action database.
RMAC provides data on affected communities to LDO who, in turn, conducts interviews
in the community and recommends area reduction, cancellation or clearance. The
RMAC then follows up with appropriate tasking. The LDO began on 1 August with four
administrative staff and two survey teams made up of eight personnel. The organisation
planned to establish clearance teams pending funding.30 The UNDP planned to continue
providing technical assistance to LMAC through its capacity development project.31
RMAC has three military and four civilian community liaison officers, who work on
collecting information from impacted communities, report on incidents, and coordinate
with the clearance operators.32 The NGOs and UNIFIL also have their own community
liaison capacity, and work closely with the LMAC community liaison teams.33
NATIONAL MINE ACTION STANDARDS AND QUALITY MANAGEMENT

The Lebanese Mine Action Center is responsible for quality management. National mine
action standards have been drafted, but as of August 2010 had not been approved.
LMAC accredits all clearance teams and conducts quality assurance. The RMAC in
Nabatieh coordinates with the UNMACC office in Naqoura for accreditation and quality
assurance of UNIFIL clearance operations.
The NGOs have their own internal quality assurance systems, based on IMAS and
although LMAC and RMAC assure the quality of all areas cleared, they are understaffed
in this area.
In 2010, a UNDP quality management technical advisor made recommendations for
changes in quality assurance policies with LMAC and RMAC to improve operational
procedures and efficiencies with its limited resources.

30

Interview with DynCorp International, Beirut, 26 August 2010
Interview with UNDP, Beirut, 31 August 2010
32
RMAC Presentation, Nabatieh, 25 August 2010
33
Interviews with NGOs in Tyre, 27 August 2010
31
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HISTORY OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT TO THE MINE ACTION
PROGRAMME
NATIONAL CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT34

The roles, responsibilities and relationships in mine action between the UN and national
authorities are described in Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations
Interagency Policy, released in 1999. It includes the subject of capacity development
support in the context of transferring management responsibility from the UN to the
national authorities.
UNMAS, since 2002, and UNDP, since 2003, have provided parallel capacity
development which includes:
•
•
•

formal courses
on-the-job training
the provision of technical expertise and equipment

The aim was to consolidate the capacity of the national authorities to a level where the
UN can withdraw, and the national authorities can manage the programme to
international standards.
The UNDP ‘capacity building for mine action centre’ project was put in place in 2001,
but only began its work in 2003 due to resistance from national authorities. Since 2004,
it has boasted significant achievements, including providing technical assistance for the
adoption of:
(a) a planning system incorporating the ESS for Mine Action in Lebanon (ESS)
(b) a long term five year (2008-2012) plan
(c) an annual integrated work plan
(d) an annual report
UNDP also supported the management of clearances beyond the national capacity with
national staff embedded with the RMAC. However, from 2002 until the end of its
mandate in 2010, it mainly focused on training LMAC personnel.
When Israeli forces withdrew from south Lebanon, and OES started in 2002, the UNDP
capacity development programme began providing technical assistance and UNMACC
assumed operational responsibilities.

34

This section is based on UNMACC Annual Reports 2001-2008, www.mineaction.org; End State Strategy and Long
Term Plan 20082012; http://www.lebmac.org and LMAC, Transition Strategy – south Lebanon 2008 and 2009, 19 August 2008.
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From 2002, UNDP sponsored or offered training courses to LMAC personnel, and
UNMAS to the MACC SL staff. These were humanitarian mine action training courses
and included:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

survey
demining
sampling
battle area clearance
community liaison
quality assurance
EOD
GIS
management, including financial management and English language

Several of the current officers at LMAC have attended training courses at James
Madison University in the United States and Cranfield University in the UK. Table 1
below lists the training offered since 2002.
Table 1: Summary of Training Courses offered to LMAC personnel by UNMAS and
UNDP 2002-2010
Training Topic
Trains and certifies six LAF quality assurance staff
Trains a ten-person sampling team; leads to accreditation in technical survey and
demining
One LAF officer accredited as a MACC SL operations officer
MDD and deminer training programme
Medical, demining and explosive ordnance disposal
One LAF officer accredited as a MACC SL planning officer
Humanitarian mine action
Two humanitarian demining courses
Two EOD l courses
Three LAF officers accredited as MACC SL QA officers
LAF Engineer Regiment taught introductory course in mine action operations and
planning
Mine action senior managers course
Mine action middle manager course
Mine action senior managers course
GIS training
Two EOD l courses
Six English language courses
Financial management
Three LAF officers receive on-the-job training as QA/Operations/Planning officers
Nine LAF soldiers trained on battle area clearance, technical survey, sampling,
provision of mine detectors, PPE, tools, EOD, survey equipment and one vehicle
to the team

Year
2002
2002

Agency
UNMAS
UNMAS

2003
2003
2003
2004
2004
2004
2004
2005
2005

UNMAS
UNDP
UNDP
UNMAS
UNDP
UNDP
UNDP
UNMAS
UNMAS

2006
2006
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007

UNDP
UNDP
UNDP
UNDP
UNDP
UNDP
UNDP
UNMAS
UNMAS
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Five LAF soldiers received on-the-job-training as community liaison officers
Trained LAF Engineering Regiment, LMAC and demining organisations on IMSMA
16 GIS training courses
Two EOD courses
Five English language courses
Certified management accounting
Nine GIS training courses
Two EOD l courses
Three English language courses
Two microsoft training courses
Four EOD courses

2007
2002-2007

UNMAS
UNMAS

2008
2008
2008
2008
2009
2009
2009
2009
2010

UNDP
UNDP
UNDP
UNDP
UNDP
UNDP
UNDP
UNDP
UNDP

Lebanon’s programme is nationally managed, with continuing UN support. In addition
to the capacity development project, UNDP has supported LMAC’s institutional
development since 2001. Support has been given via the provision of an international
technical advisor, equipment and national information technology and administration
staff.
The chief technical advisor, based at LMAC in Beirut, appears on the LMAC
organisational chart as an advisor to the director. The project was expanded to support
the handover of operational responsibility in south Lebanon from UNMACC to LMAC. It
aims to:
increase LMAC’s managerial capacity, through a policy-based mine action
programme
• finalise national standards
• complete the national technical survey, in order to:
o accurately quantify the landmine problem
o determine priorities transparently, based on the LIS
o get technical survey results and socio economic and gender factors
• develop a resource mobilisation strategy
•

The LAF personnel receive training in demining as members of the Engineer Regiment.
The training for officers includes courses on EOD and explosives, usually in the United
States, France and the UK. The army does not train its personnel in IMSMA. Since 2002,
the national database has been managed by national university graduates, with a
background in computer sciences. It is paid for by the UN, and technical support and
training is provided by the GICHD. With the army’s long term plan of employing only
military personnel at LMAC and RMAC, it trains its officers in databases.
The objectives of the 2005 and 2006 integrated work plans included:
•

supervision, coordination and quality assurance of clearance tasks implemented
by demining operators such as the army’s Engineer Regiment, NGOs and
commercial companies
19

•

technical survey to further identify mine problems and as a process of area
reduction of suspected areas identified through the LIS

The 2006 plan also included clearance and verification of minefields in areas needed for
specific development projects (the roads from Marjeyoum to Nabatieh, from Tyre to
Naqoura Road as well as the dam in Ebi-Essaqi). Marking of all areas requiring clearance
was due to be completed in 2006.
The 2008-2009 transition strategy for south Lebanon included both professional and
informal capacity development opportunities for the LAF personnel. A major part of the
capacity development activities included the training and accreditation of:
•
•
•
•
•

one LAF BAC team (nine soldiers), who were tasked with sampling of cleared
BAC sites
on-the-job training for four LAF soldiers in community liaison
on-the-job training for three LAF officers on quality assurance, operations,
planning and IMSMA
attendance at the five-week senior management training course at James
Madison University
training two officers from LMAC in quality assurance

The European Commission funded an LIS and the GICHD provided IMSMA with software
and technical support to establish a national landmine database. The US supported the
NDO with training and equipment in 1998, and paid for the construction of the regional
mine action centre in Nabatieh in 2008.
The UN still plays a key advisory role in Lebanon. In August 2010, building on the success
of the 2003 - 2010 ‘Capacity Building for Mine Action Centre’ project, the UNDP
renewed its support to Lebanon’s mine action programme by launching the ‘Support to
Lebanon Mine Action Programme- Phase II’ project.
Expected to run until the end of 2012, the project currently supports the national mine
action programme through the development of the Lebanon Mine Action Center and
the RMAC. The project supports by improving quality management norms, in order to
enhance both entities’ capacity to manage all pillars of mine action, according to
international and national standards.
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Between 2000 and 2009, Lebanon received USD 239 million from international
donors.35 Between 2005 and 2009 it received USD 152 million, an amount surpassed
only by Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan in the same five-year period. In 2009 Lebanon
35

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, www.the-monitor.org
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ranked sixth among recipients of international mine action funding, having received
USD 21 million from 12 donors.36
After the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon in May 2000, international donors, led
by the United Arab Emirates, contributed over USD 60 million to clear mines. After the
July - August 2006 hostilities, 20 international donors contributed almost USD 100
million over a two-year period. This was given via various mechanisms, including the
mine action component of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon’s (UNIFIL)
peacekeeping assessed budget, and the UNMAS Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in
Mine Action (VTF). The UNDP also provided funding support to civilian personnel at the
RMAC in Nabatieh.
When hostilities ceased in mid-August 2006, and in accordance with the UN Security
Council Resolution 1701, UNIFIL increased its troop numbers. As part of this expansion,
UNIFIL increased its demining and EOD capacities. In 2011, the level of UNIFIL
involvement in mine action was being negotiated with the UNIFIL and the Ministry of
Defense.
The 2008-2012 long term plan clearly states the government of Lebanon does not have
the resources needed to achieve the goals of the plan, nor is it likely to allocate funds
from the national budget for mine action.
Since the beginning of the mine action programme in 2000, Lebanon has had two
humanitarian crises related to landmines, ERW and cluster munitions. The Lebanese
government, through the Ministry of Defense, assigns military personnel to LMAC and
RMAC, and provides facilities in Beirut. In 2009, the estimated value of the in-kind
support was USD 6.5 million.

Summary of International Contributions: 2000-200937
Year
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
36
37

International
contributions USD
21,210,203
27,768,536
28,338,812
68,845,934
6,300,000
13,600,000
5,900,000
5,227,000
61,473,699

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor 2010, www.the-monitor.org
Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor 2001-2010; www.the-monitor.org.
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2000
Total

1,300,000
239,964,184
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TRANSITION TO NATIONAL OWNERSHIP
The transition of operational responsibility in south Lebanon from UNMACC in Tyre to
the RMAC in Nabatieh took place over a 24-month period in 2007-2008, with the
handover on 1 January 2009. Key components of the transition included:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

a new national mine action policy from the government of Lebanon in May 2006
describing the mandate of LMAC
a memorandum of understanding between LMAC and UNMAS
a UN transition officer to coordinate the process
a transition strategy with milestones,
financial commitments from UNMAS to purchase needed equipment
handover vehicles
one year funding for the civilian support staff moving from Tyre to Nabatieh
UNDP support to fund the civilian staff in Nabatieh from 2010-2012
38

TRANSITION PLANNING

In February 2007, the MACC SL hired a transition officer who, in April 2007, presented
LMAC with a transition discussion paper for comments and review. The paper was
drafted based on the transition process in Kosovo.
The 7 February 2008 memorandum of understanding between the LMAC and UNMAS
reaffirmed their commitment to working together to clear ERW throughout south
Lebanon. It included a commitment to a transition process from UNMACC to LMAC,
beginning in January 2009 when “the LMAC would resume full responsibility for all
humanitarian clearance operations throughout south Lebanon.” The UNMACC would
then reduce its capacity and remain only in the role of providing direct support to
UNIFIL clearance operations.
In April 2008, UNMACC and LMAC devised a transition plan that consisted of three key
documents and focused on the development and operations of the RMAC and the
implementation of capacity development initiatives. The transition had three goals:

1. Develop a results-oriented plan to assist LMAC in achieving its end-state strategy
2. Minimise future risks to ensure the implementation is final and the LAF has the
capacity to manage clearance operations in south Lebanon.
3. Continue supporting LMAC in meeting its goals described in the long term plan
and the end-state strategy.

38

Interviews with LMAC and UNMACC; and UNMACC and LMAC Transition Strategy - South Lebanon 2008-2009, 31
October 2008.
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The transition would divide the joint LAF – UN structure at the MACC SL:
•

The LAF would go to the RMAC and the UN component (UNMACC) to UNIFIL in
Naquora, to support UNIFIL clearance and EOD assets

•

The LAF officers working at the MACC SL would become part of the new LAFoperated RMAC

The UN also supported the transition, by providing capital equipment and technical
advisors at the RMAC in 2009.
LMAC and the UNMACC drew up a “to do” list of activities and responsibilities, with
deadlines to achieve them, partially based on a questionnaire to the stakeholders from
the MACC SL transition officer. UNMACC and LMAC also conducted a risk assessment of
the transition, which itself was interrupted by events in Lebanon in 2008 that led to a
shortage of LAF staff at RMAC. RMAC provided UNMACC with a detailed list of what
was needed to operate a mine action centre. The transition involved a large transfer of
equipment to RMAC. At the transition, UNMACC provided or purchased vehicles,
demining equipment, computers, communications equipment, office supplies, plotters
and office furniture.

Table 2: Transition Plan Activities and Responsibilities
Activity
Draft initial transition strategy with LMAC

Draft a staffing plan, with terms of reference
for each position and starting date
LMAC makes decision on type of
communication system it will use at RMAC
MACC SL and LMAC revise the National
Technical Standards and Guidelines;
UNMACC provides funding to translate them
into Arabic.
Conduct first meeting on transition strategy
Finalise transition strategy
UNMACC to submit equipment list to LMAC
on what it will provide to RMAC
LMAC identifies positions at RMAC to be
held by the military and to be held by
civilians
LMAC trained on MACC SL information
management system

Responsibility
MACC SL transition officer, with
supervision from the MACC SL
programme manager
LAF representative at MACC SL

Deadline
1 May 2008

1 May 2008

LMAC Director

1 May 2008

LMAC QA officer and MACC SL
head of QA section

No deadline set

LAF representative at MACC SL
LAF representative at MACC SL
and transition officer
MACC SL transition officer

15 May 2008
May 30, 2008
June 1 , 2008

LAF representative at MACC SL

June 1 , 2008

LMAC IT chief, supported by
MACC SL programme
information officer

Ongoing
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Meeting to identify resource gaps
LMAC makes formal request to MACC SL for
current staff to move to RMAC
Decision on LAF communications system
LAF confirms military staff including two new
officers to be assigned to RMAC
UNMACC informs LMAC which civilian
positions it can support
UNMACC, DynCorp International, UNDP and
LMAC place initial equipment in RMAC

LMAC places two new officers at RMAC and
both are trained at MACC SL
UNMACC provides remaining equipment to
RMAC

UNMACC ensures all equipment is working

LMAC chief of operations
supported by UNDP CTA
LMAC director

1 July 2008

LMAC director
LAF representative at MACC SL

15 July 2008
July 2008

MACC SL programme manager

1 August 2008

MACC SL finance/admin officer;
MACC SL logistics officer; MACC
SL transition officer; DynCorp
international programme
manager; UNDP CTA
LAF rep at MACC SL;

Delayed until funding
was assured

MACC SL finance/admin officer;
MACC SL logistics officer;
supervised by MACC SL
programme manager
MACC SL finance/admin officer;
MACC SL logistics officer;
supervised by MACC SL
programme manager

July 2008

15 August – 30
September 2008
By 9 January 2009

By 9 January 2009

The transition plan included a risk assessment. It identified factors and scenarios that
could disrupt the transition, as well as affect the mine action programme afterwards.
The transition was affected in 2008 when the political and security situation in Lebanon
deteriorated, and the LAF was unable to assign new officers to mine action. LAF
priorities in the north of Lebanon ultimately led LMAC to request a one year delay in the
transition, from January 2008 to January 2009.
There were risks not associated with the security and the political situation. The LAF
lacked resources including personnel, which could cause RMAC to lose effectiveness or
the ability to carry out its mandate to international standards. The LAF ordered that the
required number of officers be assigned to RMAC and UNMACC agreed to fund civilian
staff for 12 months, followed by three year funding from UNDP. The long term plan is
for the LAF to staff the RMAC with only military personnel. In Lebanon there is a
continual fear that Israel could attack again and re-contaminate the area.
SUCCESS OF TRANSITION PROCESS

The transition, or handover of operational responsibility, took place as planned on
1 January 2009, when the LAF moved equipment and furniture to Nabatieh. The
transition is considered an overwhelming success by all involved, although there were

25

hitches in the logistics, such as the lack of water and electricity at RMAC39 which
required the construction of temporary latrines. Eventually UNDP paid for the
infrastructure, and by mid-June 2010 the facility had water and electricity.
Another hitch was how, because of UNDP regulations40, the civilian staff contracts
expired after one year and each staff member had to reapply for his or her position,
resulting in a gap of two months when they did not go to work.
Overall, however, the transition went smoothly, largely because the key RMAC staff had
been with the MACC SL for several years, knew their job, and were ready to take
responsibility for the mine action programme in south Lebanon.

39

The US State Department had constructed the RMAC facility in Nabatieh but did not include the water and
infrastructure as part of
the project and neither UNDP nor UNMAS had sufficient funds to build the infrastructure. The LAF base at Nabatieh is
heavily
damaged from Israeli bombing.
40
They were considered new hires.
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LESSONS LEARNED
1) As a critical first step in planning an assessment of all stakeholders’ preparedness
and commitment to the transition process is required
The MACC SL transition programme officer developed questionnaires and discussion
papers at the beginning of 2007, which led to identifying a number of previously
unexamined risks that ultimately led to the postponement of the transition from 2008
to 2009, in order to further plan and build capacity. The LMAC subsequently formally
requested the UN component of the MACC SL to remain and continue its mine action
coordination functions for south Lebanon.

2) A dedicated transition officer enables quality planning and implementation of a
transition plan and maintains the momentum of the transition process.
The MACC SL transition programme officer played a key role in planning and
coordinating the transition and instilled the importance of the transition into the
stakeholders.
The appointment of the UNMACC transition programme officer in February 2007 was
critical in the preparation of key documents detailing the terms and conditions of the
transition, as well as finalising a transition strategy amenable to all stakeholders. A key
task was determining the equipment available for transfer to RMAC, and what was not
available in Lebanon and had to be purchased on the international market. The transfer
and purchase of equipment proved to be problematic.

3) It is essential to develop a detailed logistical plan and identify potential delays and
mitigation strategies.
A risk assessment and mitigation plan were a central part of the development of the
transition strategy, although the risk assessment focused primarily on political and
operational risks, rather than logistical and financial risks.
In hindsight, gaps in logistics and financial planning may have been averted if the
UNMAS programme officer in New York and the UNOPS portfolio manager had been
more closely involved in the planning, and had mitigated the delays in moving from the
UNMACC to the RMAC, which occurred on New Years’ Day 2009 when UN staff were on
leave.
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4) A trial period before the full handover should be part of the transition, in order to
identify operational problems to be corrected.
UNMACC suggested the transition be tested through a four-month trial period in which
the LAF officers would relocate to Nabatieh six months in advance of the actual
transition in order to test the systems and, if necessary, make adjustments before the
transition occurred. However, this trial period never took place, because of logistical
and financial complications regarding the transfer of equipment, and also the building in
Nabatieh at the LAF base was not ready for use; in January 2009 it still lacked water and
electricity.
This impacted communications and information management as well as general
working conditions, as temporary latrines had to be constructed. RMAC had no running
water for months. The UNMACC and the RMAC-N adapted accordingly to this situation
but have highlighted that solving these problems during a trial period in which they did
not impact on operations would have been better.

5) A transition plan should describe the post-transition relationship between
stakeholders.
The post-transition relationship between the LMAC, RMAC, UNMACC and UNIFIL took a
significant period of time to negotiate and finalise. This took the form of a
memorandum of understanding, which described in detail the operational
management, coordination and liaison between the various agencies. This document
was not finalised and signed until October 2009, some ten months after the transition.
Ideally a memorandum of understanding should be negotiated before the transition
occurs.

6) A mine action structure after the transition should be based on the available
resources of the national authority rather than a generic structure, assuming the same
resources are available as under the UN structure.
The resource limitations of the Ministry of Defense are well known. One of the reasons
why international support has been critical to the mine action programme in Lebanon
since its inception is the size of the Engineer Regiment and the number of personnel the
LAF can allocate to mine action.
Until the number of cluster submunition and minefield sites have been reduced, in
addition to a parallel reduction in RMAC staff, international resources will be required.
In its role of building capacity, the UN should advise on a structure appropriate for the
available resources.
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One of the shortcomings of a military-run mine action programme is that regular staff
rotations result in a loss of skills and knowledge among the mine action team. Also, it
takes time for new personnel to learn processes, procedures and the programme. The
Lebanon mine action programme is no exception to these inherent impediments. The
government of Lebanon’s ESS, approved in 2004, recognised this shortcoming and
included use of international and civilian personnel expertise as needed, as part of the
strategy in achieving a mine impact free state.
Although, at the time of this study in August 2010, LMAC had a very experienced officer
corps managing the programme in both Beirut and Nabatieh, the three-year rotation
schedule creates staff turnover, which affects at least the momentum of clearance
operations.
Staff rotations at RMAC and the unexpected redeployment of staff to meet other
defence needs in Lebanon sometimes delay quality assurance or slow down operations,
as new staff become acquainted with procedures.
Overall, the rotation of staff was viewed as an inherent but manageable problem rather
than a detriment to the programme.

7) Transparency and regularity in reporting are critical aspects to a mine action
programme. One significant difference in the mine action programme since the
transition in January 2009 is the frequency in reporting on achievements and the
remaining contamination.
From 2006 to 2008, the MACC SL produced monthly and annual reports, funding
updates and analysis, and managed a website, www.maccsl.org. The website is no
longer operational though its reports are still available at www.mineaction.org.
Since January 2009, reporting on the mine action programme has been reduced to
presentations at international meetings related to the APMBC and the CCM. While
LMAC operates its own website, it is not up-to-date and it contains no current data or
detail comparable to what was available in the MACC SL reports. The lack of regular
reporting, combined with LMAC’s tight control over data, is a weak point in the posttransition period.
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ANNEXES

ANNEX I

Persons Interviewed
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Brig. General Mohammad Fehmi, Director, LMAC, Beirut
Lt. Colonel Mohammad El Cheikh, Logistic and Administration Section Head, MRE
Section Head, LMAC, Beirut
Colonel Rolly Fares, IMSMA Mine Victim Assistance Section Head/Technical Survey
Project Manager, LMAC, Beirut
Major Charmen Rahal, RMAC, Nabatieh
Oussama Merhi, IT and Information Manager, LMAC, Beirut
Allan Poston, Chief Technical Advisor, UNDP, Beirut
William Fryer, Technical Advisor, UNDP, Beirut
Celine Moyroud, Crisis Prevention and Recovery Advisor, UNDP, Beirut
Allen Kelly, Chief of Operations and Plans, Mine Action Coordination Centre
UNIFIL- Naqoura, Southern Lebanon, UNMAS
Marc Bonnet, Programme Manager, Mine Action Coordination Centre
UNIFIL- Naqoura, Southern Lebanon, UNMAS
Dr. Christina Louise Bennike, Country Programme Manager, MAG, Tyre
Claus Nielson, Programme Manager, DCA, Tyre
Kassem Ghossein, Operations Manager, NPA, Tyre
Jenny Reeves, Programme Manager, Handicap International, Beirut
Adrian Ridoutt, Project Manager, DynCorp International, Beirut
Sandrine Petroni, Attache, Head of Programmes, European Union, Beirut
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